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Abstract
I demonstrate that providing information about product quality is
not necessarily the best way to address asymmetric information problems
when markets are imperfectly competitive. In a vertical di￿erentiation
model I show that a Minimum Quality Standard, which retains asymmet-
ric information, generates more welfare than a label, which provides full
information.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that providing information about
product quality is not necessarily the best way to address asymmetric informa-
tion problems when the market is imperfectly competitive.
Consider a market for a product of potentially varying levels of quality.
Suppose the ￿rms producing the product have control over the quality of their
product, but consumers are unable to observe the level of quality (for instance,
think of microbiological contaminants in food, chemical residues in toys or safety
characteristics of automobiles). This creates a classic asymmetric information
market failure, with which ￿rms are unable to credibly commit to producing
high-quality products in exchange for higher prices. An obvious remedy would
be for governments to set up testing facilities and apply labels to certify the
validity of the ￿rms’ quality claims. This would enable ￿rms to produce high-
quality goods at high prices for quality-conscious consumers as well as low-
quality products to consumers, who care less about quality.
However, I show in this paper that when the market is imperfectly com-
petitive, a Minimum Quality Standard (MQS), which retains the information
asymmetry and therefore forces all consumers to purchase the same homogen-
eous product, is acutally superior to a label providing full information. What
is more, having a standard with asymmetric information is even better than
having a standard with full information! The reason is that with asymmetric
information consumers consider the products sold by di￿erent ￿rms to be homo-
geneous and competition is relatively intense. In contrast, with full information
the ￿rms can di￿erentiate their products by quality and thereby reduce the
competitive pressure. As a result, although the label solves the asymmetric
information market failure it introduces another, imperfect competition. The
MQS only partially adresses the asymmetric information, but it also prevents
the ￿rms from exploiting their market power. It is a trade-o￿ between two
market failures, asymmetric information and imperfect competition, and in this
paper the latter always dominate.
These results have important policy implications. They show how an intuit-
ively appealing policy response to an asymmetric information market failure, to
provide information by applying a label, can actually be inferior to less obvious
remedies when additional market failures, such as imperfect competition, exist.
The conclusions advocate caution when designing policies to ensure that due
consideration is given to how the policies could indirectly a￿ect the competitive
environment, and perhaps they also help explain why governments sometimes
choose to apply a label and in other circumstances impose a MQS to address
seemingly similar problems.
The model in this paper follows the vertical product di￿erentiation literat-
ure pioneered by Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979), which investigates imperfectly
competive markets characterised by products that are di￿erentiated by qual-
ity (as opposed to horizontal di￿erentiation, according to which goods are just
di￿erent, not necessarily better or worse). Shaked and Sutton (1982) showed
that vertical di￿erentiation can be used to alleviate price competition and that
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a natural duopoly can earn positive pro￿ts even with free entry, constant mar-
ginal costs and arbitrarily small sunk costs. A string of authors have since
then expanded on the model. Motta (1993) generalised the model framework
to include quality competition (Cournot) as an alternative to price competi-
tion (Bertrand) as well as quality-dependent ￿xed or marginal costs. He found
that the results of Shaked and Sutton (1982) are qualitatively robust (albeit
less extreme) to the alternative model speci￿cations. Ronnen (1991) included
quality-dependent ￿xed costs and concluded that the market equilibrium pro-
duced too much product di￿erentiation (and thus bestowed too much market
power on ￿rms) and that a MQS enhances welfare by raising quality and redu-
cing product di￿erentiation. Crampes and Hollander (1995) investigated the use
of a MQS with quality-dependent marginal costs and found that in contrast to
Ronnen (1991) a MQS may not always bene￿t consumers. Boom (1995) added
the international trade dimension and showed how asymmetric quality regula-
tion in di￿erent countries could have spillover e￿ects in otherwise segregated
markets.
The main contributions of this paper are to introduce asymmetric informa-
tion with respect to quality to the vertical di￿erentiation model, and to investig-
ate the welfare impacts of various policy options to address this market failure.
My model can be seen as a generalisation of the framework in the sense that
it incorporates the speci￿cation by Crampes and Hollander (1995) as a special
case.
2 Method
My model builds on the vertical product di￿erentiation model by Gabszewicz
and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982). In their model, a Bertrand
duopoly sells a product to a continuum of consumers, who earn di￿erent levels of
income. By di￿erentiating their products by quality, the ￿rms alleviate the price
competition and earn positive pro￿ts. More speci￿cally, my model resembles
the version introduced by Crampes and Hollander (1995), in which the two
￿rms cover the whole market (all consumers choose to buy one of the varieties),
marginal costs are positive and increasing in quality, and consumer heterogeneity
is based on tastes rather than income.
I depart from the previous work of these authors by introducing asymmetric
information with respect to product quality, and by analysing and comparing
the impact of di￿erent policy instruments intended to address the information
imperfections.
Asymmetric information turns the vertically di￿erentiated product into a
homogeneous product. Consumers are unable to observe the level of quality
(before purchase as well as after consumption) and are therefore also unable to
distinguish between the output of the two ￿rms. In the absence of regulation
the two ￿rms will supply the lowest possible level of quality, due to the ￿lemons￿-
problem identi￿ed by Akerlof (1970). The two ￿rms would like to supply a higher
level of quality in order to capture part of the consumers’ higher willingness to
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pay, but since consumers have no means of varifying the ￿rms claims of higher
quality, they do not ￿nd the claims credible. If they did, the ￿rms would have
incentives for supplying the lowest level of quality anyway and reap even greater
pro￿ts.
The market failure provides justi￿cation for regulating the market. I consider
three policy options:
1. Label
2. Minimum Quality Standard
3. Minimum Quality Standard combined with a label
The obvious remedy to information imperfections would be to provide informa-
tion in the form of a government label certifying the claims of the ￿rms. For sim-
plicity, I assume that the government can costlessly observe the level of quality
and apply the label, so the government label essentially removes the information
assymmetries and reverts the market to the full information setting of Crampes
and Hollander (1995). Alternatively, the government can enforce a Minimum
Quality Standard (MQS), which Leland (1979) shows improves welfare in an
Akerlof (1970) model. In my model, the government can costlessly specify the
level of quality supplied by the ￿rms to maximise total welfare. However, the
information asymmetry persists and the products are still considered homogen-
eous. A ￿nal policy option is to combine the MQS with a label, which amounts
to introducing a standard in the full information setting, which Crampes and
Hollander (1995) show is welfare improving over the label alone.
3 Model
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their taste for quality. Each con-
sumer is represented by their willingness to pay for quality, , which is uniformly
distributed over the range [1;],  > 1, with density f () = 1
 1 (the size of the
total consumer base as well as the lower bound of the taste range are normal-
ised to unity). The consumers purchase at most one unit of the di￿erentiated
product and choose between the varieties o￿ered by the two ￿rms. In principle,
consumers could choose not to purchase anything, but for simplicity I limit the
parameter values to ranges that rule out this outcome. I show in the appendix
that assuming 1 <  < 9
5 is su￿cient for this purpose.
At this point, a small remark in relation to Shaked and Sutton (1982) is
in order. They show in their model that there is a speci￿c range of consumer
heterogeneity, equivalent to 2 <  < 4, within which exactly two ￿rms can earn
strictly positive pro￿ts. The parameter range considered in this paper, falls
short of this ￿sweet spot￿. In Shaked’s and Sutton’s model, a  < 2 would imply
that the low-quality ￿rm would have to price at marginal costs, while the high-
quality ￿rm could still generate positive pro￿ts. However, they assume that
production is costless, whereas I consider marginal costs that are quadratic in
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quality. Under this assumption, I will show that not only can both ￿rms earn
positive pro￿ts as long as  > 1, they earn exactly the same pro￿ts.
Consumers’ utility is given by
U = ui   pi (1)
where ui is the quality of the chosen variety, i, and pi is its price. Each ￿rm
supplies one variety at constant marginal costs given by ci = u2
i. I denote the
two varieties by uh and ul, with uh  ul, for the high- and low-quality variety,
respectively. Both ￿rms are completely identical, so there is no need to identify
exactly which ￿rm supplies the high-quality variety and which the low-quality
variety. The government chooses between three policy options, the label, the
standard, and the combined label and standard, to maximise total welfare given
by
W = CS + h + l (2)
where CS is aggregate consumer surplus and i is the pro￿ts of ￿rm i, i = h;l.
The model constitutes a three stage game. In the ￿rst stage, the government
chooses policy. In the second stage, both ￿rms observe the government policy
and choose quality levels in conformity with regulation. Finally, in the third
stage the two ￿rms observe the quality levels supplied by the ￿rms and choose
prices. In the absence of regulation, the two varieties are identical with quality
equal to zero. As a result, the ￿rms play a standard Bertrand game with a
homogeneous product, in which prices are set at marginal costs (equal to zero),
￿rms earn zero pro￿ts and consumers derive zero utility. I will brie￿y sketch
the equilibrium of the di￿erent policy options below.
3.1 Minimum Quality Standard
With a MQS, the two ￿rms sell a homogeneous product priced at marginal
costs, ph = pl = u2, where u is the quality of the homogeneous product. As the
supply curves of the two ￿rms are horizontal and identical, the sales of each ￿rm
is unidenti￿ed. However, it does not really matter, as pro￿ts are zero anyway,
so we can basically ignore the two ￿rms. A consumer with taste parameter, ,
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(3)
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If the government applies a label, consumers obtain full information about the
products and the ￿rms may di￿erentiate their varieties. The ￿rms make their
choices during two sequential stages. In the ￿rst stage, they determine simul-
tanously the quality of their varieties, and in the second stage, having observed
the qualities o￿ered, they set prices (also simultaneously).
The consumers can now observe the quality of the two varieties, and they
choose the one that generates the highest utility given their tastes for quality. I
denote by ~  the marginal consumer, who is indi￿erent between consuming any
of the two varieties. She is de￿ned as





Consumers, whose willingness to pay for quality is larger than that of the mar-
ginal consumer, strictly prefer the high-quality variety and therefore chooses
this. Conversely, demand for the low-quality variety is generated by all con-























In the price-setting stage, the ￿rms take quality levels as given and set prices
to maximise pro￿ts given by
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I show in the appendix that the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices given quality








((uh   ul)(   2) + ch + 2cl) (13)









(uh   ul)[a(   2) + uh + ul]
2 (15)
In the quality-setting stage, ￿rms choose quality levels to maximise pro￿ts
given by (14) and (15). The detailed derivations are presented in the appendix,









(5   ) (17)
In principle, the exact identities of the high- and the low-quality ￿rms are inde-
terminate. Either of the ￿rms can become the high-quality ￿rm and be desig-
nated ￿rm h, in which case the other ￿rm necessarily has to be ￿rm l. It does
not really matter which ￿rm is what as they are completely identical, but in
order for (16) and (17) to be Nash equilibrium quality levels, I have to show that
no ￿rm has an incentive to unilateral switch place with the other ￿rm, e.g. that
￿rm l has no incentive to leap-frog ￿rm h and become the high-quality producer
itself. It turns out that this is particularly easy given the speci￿c functional
form chosen for the marginal costs in this model. In the appendix I show that
the equilibrium pro￿ts are exactly the same for the two ￿rms





This is not a general result, but follows from the choice of quadratic marginal
costs. The high-quality ￿rm charges a higher market price but also faces higher
marginal costs. It turns out that these two factors exactly o￿-set to produce the
same pro￿ts. Thus, no ￿rm would have any incentives for switching position in
the quality spectrum. Crampes and Hollander (1995) show that leap-frogging
is also sub-optimal for ￿rms with more general marginal cost functions that are
convex in quality.
3.3 MQS combined with a label
Finally, the government may choose to apply a label and, at the same time,
impose a MQS. Obviously, if the standard set by the government is lower than
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quality freely chosen by the low-quality ￿rm, the regulation will be non-binding
and the equilibrium resembles the label-only case described above. With a
binding MQS, denoted by ^ u > ul the nature of the strategic interaction changes
somewhat. The quality of the low-quality ￿rm is essentially determined by the
standard, and the high-quality ￿rm chooses its best-response to the standard,
uh (^ u) = 1
3 (2   1 + ^ u). The stragetic interaction is now between the high-
quality ￿rm and the government, with the government acting as a ￿rst-mover.
Deriving the explicit solution is cumbersome, but it is shown in some detail in





































4 Comparing the policy options
From the characterisation of the equilibrium outcome of the di￿erent policy
options investigated above, we see that in all cases, the equilibrium quality
levels depend on the degree of dispersion in consumer tastes, . Speci￿cally, in
the limit as consumers become more homogeneous,  ! 1, the qualities of both
products in the di￿erent cases all converge towards the same level, ~ u = 1
2.
Conversely, when consumers become more heterogeneous in their tastes, the
equilibrium qualities under the di￿erent policy options diverge. It is instructive
to look at the patterns of how the quality levels diverge as  increases in more
detail.
In the case of a label (with no MQS), which is equivalent to a full informa-
tion setting without regulation, the quality of the high-quality variety increases
whereas that of the low-quality variety declines as  increases. This is the
￿product di￿erentiation to alleviate price competition￿-e￿ect demonstrated by
Shaked and Sutton (1982), which is more predominant the higher is . With a
MQS and no label (i.e. with asymmetric information), product di￿erentiation is
not possible, but the optimal standard determining product quality is increasing
in  to accommodate the tastes of the more quality-conscious consumers. Note
that the optimal standard is exactly the average quality of what the ￿rms would
have chosen with a label and no MQS (uMQS = 1
2 (uh  +ul)).
Finally, when combining the MQS with a label, the quality of both varieties
increase in , but the quality of the high-quality variety increases by more than
that of the low-quality product. In other words, although product di￿erentiation
is possible under the combined policy option, the degree of di￿erentiation is
less than when the government only applies the label (no MQS). This is the
mechanism generating the positive welfare e￿ects of a MQS inCrampes and
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Hollander (1995): starting from a situation with full information (a label), if
the government imposes a MQS, it reduces product di￿erentiation and hence
the market power of the ￿rms, which in turn increases total welfare.
I am now in a position to present the results of this paper in the form of the
following three propositions.
Proposition 1. a Minimum Quality Standard chosen to maximise total wel-
fare generates more welfare than a label applied to provide full information to
consumers.
Proof. The nature of the proof is straightforward. With speci￿c functional forms
for the distribution of consumers and production costs, it is possible to derive
explicit solutions for quality levels (as presented above), pro￿ts and consumer
surplus. Choosing a MQS the government retains the information asymmetry,
and the equilibrium reverts to the outcome of a standard Bertrand game with
homogeneous goods. Hence, ￿rms earn zero pro￿ts and total welfare consists of











(ul   pl)f ()d +
 
~ 
(uh   ph)f ()d (22)
where ~  =
ph pl
uh ul is the marginal consumer, who is indi￿erent between purchas-
ing the high- and the low-quality product. Adding pro￿ts of the two ￿rms, I





2 + 14 + 1

(23)
What remains is simply to compare total welfare with a MQS and with a label.
De￿ne the di￿erence in welfare outcome of the two policy options as





2 > 0 (24)
which is stricly positive for all  > 1.
Despite the fact that asymmetric information is clearly reducing total wel-
fare, it is not optimal for the government to address the imperfections directly
by providing the needed information. It can be explained by reference to a
second-best argument. The government struggles with two market failures,
asymmetric information and imperfect competition. The information imper-
fection drives quality levels to a minimum, but it also prevents the ￿rms from
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exploiting their market power. The label solves one market failure, but intro-
duces another as ￿rms are now able to di￿erentiate their products to alleviate
price competition (Shaked and Sutton, 1982). In contrast, the MQS retains the
information imperfection with its perfectly competitive outcome, but reduces
the adverse impact of the market failure by raising quality.
Crampes and Hollander (1995) show that a MQS can be welfare improving
(at the margin) in a full information setting. Translated into my model, they
show that a MQS combined with a label is superior to label alone. The obvious
question is whether a combined MQS and label is also superior to the MQS
alone. The second proposition answers this question.
Proposition 2. a Minimum Quality Standard chosen to maximise total welfare
generates more welfare without a label than when combined with a label.
Proof. The strategy is the same as in Proposition 1, derive a explicit solu-
tions and compare total welfare under the two policy options. The principle
is straightforward, but the manipulations needed are much more cumbersome,
so I rely on computer-aided derivation. 1 De￿ne CH = WMQS   WCH as the
di￿erence between welfare under a MQS alone and a MQS combined with a













2 > 0 (25)
which is strictly positive for all  > 1.
Proposition 2 shows that when the government has the ability to costlessly
impose a MQS, asymmetric information is actually welfare improving over full
information. The reason is, as above, that full information enables ￿rms to
exploit their market power. The distortions arising from imperfect competition
outweigh the those from asymmetric information, as the latter are reduced by
the MQS.
Proposition 3. The gains from choosing a MQS without a label over alternative
policies increases with the dispersion in consumer tastes, .
Proof. By di￿erentiating (24) and (25) with respect to  it is easy to see that
@LBL=@ > 0 and @CH=@ > 0 for  > 1.
Proposition 3 states that the more di￿erent are consumers’ tastes, the more
governments prefer to avoid a label, which would allow ￿rms to produce di￿er-
entiated products. Intuitively, one would expect di￿erentiated products to be
preferable when consumers have di￿erent taste. However, when ￿rms have mar-
ket power, greater consumer heterogeneity induces more product di￿erentiation,
which in turn increases the distortions arising from imperfect competition.
1All derivations are checked using Maple 14 software. An electronic copy or a print of the
Maple ￿le can be obtained by contacting the author.
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5 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates a few counterintuitive results that arise from the inter-
action of two market failures, asymmetric information and imperfect competi-
tion. Asymmetric information by itself reduces welfare, but it also prevents ￿rms
from exploiting their market power. The optimal policy is therefore one that
retains the information asymmetry, while reducing the its distorting impact.
In my particular model, the MQS is always the most preferred policy of
the three options investigated. In a more general framework the picture may
be more nuanced. For instance, ￿rms compete in prices, implying that the
information asymmetry has a large impact on market power (essentially gener-
ating the perfectly competitive outcome). Motta (1993) shows that the ￿product
di￿erentiation to allviate competition￿-e￿ect also exists in models buildling on
Cournot quantity competition but that it is less extreme than in Bertrand praice
competition models. The results of this paper are therefore likely to generalise
to quantity competition, but perhaps only for higher values of the consumer
heterogeneity parameter, .
To obtain explicit solutions necessary for a discrete comparison of the dif-
ferent policy options, I needed to assume speci￿c functional forms for the dis-
tribution of consumers tastes and marginal costs of production. The uniform
taste distribution is standard practice in the literature (see e.g. Shaked and
Sutton (1982); Ronnen (1991); Crampes and Hollander (1995)). Generalising
this assumption is unlikely to qualitatively change the results, but it may limit
the welfare superiority of the MQS to the higher ranges of . For instance,
suppose a relatively large mass of consumers is concentrated at a single peak in
the distribution, as opposed to the uniform distribution that features no peak.
Intuitively, the two ￿rms would try to capture most of these consumers, which
would lead to a narrowing in the gap in quality between the products and hence
increase the competitive pressure. This would have the same e￿ect as a decline
in , which does not change the results qualitatively (unless consumers become
completely homogeneous,  = 1). Similarly, results should also be robust to
a more general marginal cost function, as long as it is still convex in quality.
As mentioned earlier, the ￿nding that the equilibrium pro￿ts of the two ￿rms
is exactly the same is attributed to the speci￿c functional form, but this out-
come is immaterial to the validity of the main results summarised by the three
propositions.
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Appendix
The appendix provides greater detail on the derivations of the results in this
paper.
Label
Consider ￿rst the price-setting stage. For given levels of quality, the two ￿rms
choose prices to maximise pro￿ts given by














































which constitute a system of two equations in two unknowns (prices) given










(uh   ul) + ch
uh   ul   cl

(30)
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(uh   ul) + ch
uh   ul   cl

(31)








((uh   ul)(   2) + ch + 2cl) (33)
Inserting the equilibrium prices into the pro￿t expressions and using ci = u2
i,



































[(uh   ul)(2   1)   ch + cl]









[a(uh   ul)(   2) + ch   cl]








[(uh   ul)(2   1)   ch + cl]
2
9(   1)(uh   ul)
(38)
l (uh;ul) =
[(uh   ul)(   2) + ch   cl]
2











(uh   ul)[(   2) + uh + ul]
2 (41)
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In the quality-setting stage, ￿rms choose quality levels to maximise pro￿ts







(2   1   uh   ul)














(2   1   uh   ul)(2   1   uh   ul   2(uh   ul)) = 0 (42)
(   2 + uh + ul)(2(uh   ul)    + 2   uh   ul) = 0 (43)
Each ￿rst order condition has two solutions - one resulting in zero pro￿ts. These
are clearly not pro￿t maximising. So the pro￿t maximising equilibrium must
satisfy
2   1   3uh + ul = 0 (44)
uh   3ul    + 2 = 0 (45)
Substituting uh in (44) yields




(5   ) (46)
which inserted into (45) yields
uh =





(5   1) (47)
To derive equilibrium pro￿ts of the two ￿rms, insert the equilibrium quality




(5   1)   (5   )
8

(2   1)  







(5   1)   (5   )
8
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(   2) +
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MQS combined with a label
The government chooses a MQS, ^ u, which is only binding if ^ u > ul. I will
assume that this is the case, and check if the assumption is indeed satis￿ed
once the optimal MQS is obtained. With a binding MQS, the quality of the
low-quality variety is given by the standard and that of the high-quality variety
is given as the high-quality ￿rms’ best response to the standard, hence
uh (^ u) =
1
3
(2   1 + ^ u) (53)
ul = ^ u (54)
The government, acting as a ￿rst-mover, take these best response functions into
account when setting ^ u. Thus the governments problem is to choose the MQS
that maximises total welfare given by
W (^ u) = CS (^ u) + h (^ u) + l (^ u)
=
 ~ (^ u)
1
(^ u   pl (^ u))f ()d +
 
~ (^ u)









(uh (^ u)   ^ u)[   2 + uh (^ u) + ^ u]
2 (55)
where ~ (^ u) =
ph(^ u) pl(^ u)
^ u uh(^ u) is the marginal consumer, who is indi￿erent between
choosing either of the two varieties.
The simple way to obtain the solution to this maximisation problem is to feed
(55) along with equilibrium prices, best response functions and the de￿nition of
the marginal consumer into a computer and press ￿maximise￿. I have done this
in Maple 14 to make sure my derivations are correct. In the following, I will
describe the derivations done by hand. To keep it manageable, consider each of
the components in turn. Consider ￿rst Consumer Surplus
CS (^ u) =
 ~ (^ u)
1
(^ u   pl (^ u))f ()d +
 
~ (^ u)








2 ^ u   ~ (^ u)pl (^ u)  
1
2





































2 (uh (^ u)   ^ u)   ~ (^ u)(ph (^ u)   pl (^ u))

(56)
Split the expression for consumer surplus into two blocks, such that CS (^ u) =
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2 (uh (^ u)   ^ u)   ~ (^ u)(ph (^ u)   pl (^ u))

(58)





ph (^ u)   pl (^ u)











(ph (^ u)   pl (^ u))
2







(uh (^ u)   ^ u)( + 1) + uh (^ u)
2   ^ u2
2






(uh (^ u)   ^ u)( + 1 + uh (^ u) + ^ u)
2 (59)









(uh (^ u)   ^ u)[   2 + uh (^ u) + ^ u]
2 (61)
it follows that total welfare can be written as the sum of the four blocks, and
that the ￿rst order condition can be obtained by di￿erentiating each of the four
blocks with respect to ^ u and setting the sum of the results equal to zero.






















It follows from (53) above that
duh(^ u)
d^ u = 1
3. Prices are slightly more complicated.
From (32) and (33), equilibrium prices as functions of the standard can be
written as




(uh (^ u)   ^ u)(2   1) + 2uh (^ u)
2 + ^ u2

(63)




(uh (^ u)   ^ u)(   2) + uh (^ u)
2 + 2^ u2

(64)










(2   1) +
4
9





(22^ u   2(2   1)) (65)










(   2) +
2
9





(38^ u + 2(5   )) (66)






























172   8   44^ u + 76^ u   7

(67)







 + 1 +
1
3








(2   1 + ^ u)   ^ u

 + 1 +
1
3



















2   1  
1
3








(2   1 + ^ u)   ^ u

2   1  
1
3



















   2 +
1
3








(2   1 + ^ u)   ^ u

   2 +
1
3










52   2   16^ u + 32^ u   16^ u2   7

(70)
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512 + 48   300^ u + 780^ u   480^ u2   219

= 0 (71)
This is, admittedly, not a very pretty expression. It can, however, be shown

























(780   300   960^ u) (74)
Evaluated at the ￿rst root, the second order condition becomes
d2W (^ u1)









for all  > 1. It is easily shown that the condition evaluated at the second
root has the opposite sign. In other words, ^ u1 maximises total welfare, whereas
^ u2 is the welfare minimising standard. In conclusion, the optimal regulation
generates quality levels for the two varieties of
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Detailed derivations in the proof of proposition 1
I need to derive an expression for equilibrium welfare in the labelling case and
compare that with welfare under a MQS (and no label). It is shown above that
equilibrium pro￿ts can be written as





what remains is deriving an expression for consumer surplus. Earlier in the ap-
pendix, I showed that to make the derivations more manageable consumer sur-
























(uh   ul)( + 1 + uh + ul)
2 (80)
Consider ￿rst the equilibrium prices, given quality levels uh = 1
8 (5   1) and
ul = 1

































































22   3 + 1










2   3 + 2
















252   58 + 49

(88)
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 292 + 54   25













292   50 + 29

(89)





















Finally, adding the two blocks, we can write equilibrium consumer surplus as





 232 + 62   23

(91)
To obtain total welfare, add the pro￿ts of the two ￿rms to consumer surplus
to get





 232 + 62   23 + 24
 






2 + 14 + 1

(92)
Parameter values consistent with assumptions
In this model I assume that both ￿rms exist (there is demand for both varieties)
and the market is covered (all consumers choose to buy one of the products).
Mathematically, these assumptions can be expressed as




I will show that 1 <   9
5 satis￿es the two conditions under all policy options.
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Consider ￿rst the MQS (without label). In this case, the two ￿rms produce
homogeneous goods and sell them at equal prices. The speci￿c market shares
of the two ￿rms are undetermined and the marginal consumer ~  is unde￿ned.
The dupoly assumption is therefore consistent wtih any value of . Prices are
given by marginal costs, and the level of quality is determined by the MQS, so







( + 1)  1 ,
  3 (95)






















 + 1 +















( + 1) (96)
The marginal consumer is always the median consumer, so the duopoly condi-
tion is always satis￿ed. To evaluate the covered market condition (94), insert









(5   ) ,
252   50 + 9  0 (97)





, implying that the condition is
satis￿ed within this range (although  > 1 by de￿nition).
Finally, investigate the case of a MQS combined with a label. The marginal
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As  ! 1, ~  ! 1 and ~  t 1:5 for  = 9
5. The duopoly condition is satis￿ed for
both ends of the parameter range (1 <   9
5) and since (98) is linear in , it
must also be satis￿ed for all values of  within the range. Deriving the parameter
range that satisfy the covered market condition (94) is more complicated, and I
have not made the calculations by hand. However, computer-aided derivations
show that the condition is satis￿ed for approximately  0:2738 <  < 2:2738,
which includes the range 1 <   9
5 assumed in this paper.2
In conclusion, assuming 1 <   9
5 is su￿cient for obtaining an equilibrium
in which the market is covered and both ￿rms exist in all the cases considered
in this paper.
2A copy or a print of the Maple-￿le can be obtained by contacting the author
22